













Gary L. Hardcastle 
Department of Philosophy, 0126 
Virginia Tech 
Blacksburg, VA  24061-0126 
garyh@vt.edu  http://truth.phil.vt.edu/ 
  
 A Problem-Solving Account of Scientific Explanation 
2 
 





An account of scientific explanation is presented according 
to which (1) scientific explanation consists in solving 
“insight” problems (Metcalfe and Wiebe 1984) and (2) 
understanding is the result of solving such problems.  The 
theory is pragmatic;  it draws upon van Fraassen’s (1977, 
1980) insights, avoids the objections to pragmatic accounts 
offered by Kitcher and Salmon (1987), and relates 
scientific explanation directly to understanding.  The 
theory also accommodates cases of explanatory asymmetry and 
intuitively legitimate rejections of explanation requests. 
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1. The Problem of Scientific Explanation 
 
The explanans of any genuine scientific explanation bear a 
relation of explanatory relevance to that explanation’s 
explanandum.  The central philosophical task associated with 
scientific explanation is the description of this relation, and 
competing philosophical theories of scientific explanation can 
often be understood as singling out some relation as “the” 
relation of explanatory relevance.  However, another way to 
respond to this philosophical task is to hold that there is no 
single correct relation of explanatory relevance, but that what 
counts as the appropriate relation varies with facts about the 
people giving, and getting, the explanation.  This response 
characterizes pragmatic theories of scientific explanation, for 
on such views explanans can bear on explananda in a genuine 
scientific explanation in any number of ways, depending on the 
people involved (cf. Hempel 1965, pp. 425-433 and Humphreys 
1989, pp. 126-127;  see also Section 4 below). 
In this section I examine van Fraassen’s (1977, 1980) 
pragmatic account of explanation (for other accounts see 
Achinstein (1983, 1986) and Churchland (1989)), and the 
objection leveled against it by Kitcher and Salmon (1987).  In 
Section 2 I describe two approaches to scientific explanation, 
and reasons for pursuing one over the other.  In Section 3 a 
sketch of some features of understanding and some experimental 
studies of “insight problems” motivate the problem-solving 
account of explanation described there.  The problem-solving 
account of explanation is a pragmatic account in the spirit of 
van Fraassen’s;  its central tenants are that (1) scientific 
explanation consists in solving “insight” problems, and (2) 
understanding is the result of solving such problems.  The final 
section addresses some objections and touts the virtues of the 
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problem-solving account -- it accommodates both explanatory 
asymmetries and legitimate rejections of explanation requests, 
is immune to Kitcher and Salmon’s objection to pragmatic 
accounts, and connects scientific explanation and understanding.i 
Van Fraassen’s account is cast within an erotetic framework, 
in which scientific explanations are presented as answers to 
explanation-seeking why-questions.  Pragmatic and erotetic 
accounts of explanation often go hand in hand (as Humphreys 
(1989, p. 133) has noted), but they need not.  In presenting van 
Fraassen’s account below I will use some familiar erotetic 
machinery, but it is not part of my view that all explanations 
are, or can be framed as, answers to explanation-seeking why-
questions;  indeed, it seems clear that some cannot (see Salmon 
1989, 137-138) 
Van Fraassen’s account specifies as the formal structure of an 
explanation-seeking why-question Q an ordered triple <PK, X, R> 
offered against background knowledge K, in which PK is a 
proposition (the topic of Q);  X is a contrast class of 
propositions {P1, P2, P3, ... PK,...};  and R is a relevance 
relation.  On this account, for example, the interrogative ‘Why 
did the Titanic sink?’ is typically elliptical for the question 
<PK, X, R>, where PK is the proposition that the Titanic sunk, X 
is {The Titanic sunk, The Titanic did not sink} and R is the 
relation of causation.  The same interrogative may of course 
represent a different question, say, one with a different 
contrast class or relevance relation (see van Fraassen 1980, p. 
142;  Salmon 1989, pp. 139-40). 
In general, to pose Q is to presuppose that PK is true, that PK 
is the only true member of X, and that there is some true 
proposition A which bears R to <PK, X>.  It is appropriate to 
raise Q only in contexts where these three presuppositions are 
satisfied.  Specifically, Q arises in K iff K entails 
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(a) PK is true and 
(b) no member of X other than PK is true, 
 
and K does not entail that 
 
(c) no true A stands in R to <PK, X>. 
 
Questions posed in contexts where they do not arise are, 
technically speaking, mistaken.  Mistaken questions admit 
corrective answers, which consist in pointing out either that K 
does not entail (a)-(b) or that it does entail (c).  A 
corrective answer may lead to a reformulated explanation-seeking 
why-question.  If asked why the Titanic struck another ship 
(rather than nothing), for example, the appropriate (corrective) 
answer is to point out that the Titanic did not strike another 
ship (i.e., the topic is false) and add perhaps that it did 
strike an iceberg, suggesting the question, “Why did the Titanic 
strike an iceberg (rather than nothing)?”  In such fashion van 
Fraassen’s account manages one task of a theory of explanation, 
namely, to “account for legitimate rejections of explanatory 
requests” (van Fraassen 1980, 146).  A question is legitimately 
rejected in a context K just if it does not arise on K.  Unless 
otherwise noted, the explanation-seeking why-questions discussed 
below will be presumed to arise. 
A direct answer to Q is a proposition of the form “PK in 
contrast to the rest of X, because A”, where 
 
(I) A is true, 
(ii) PK is true, 
(iii) Each Pj in X is false if j≠k, and 
(iv) A bears R to <PK, X> (van Fraassen 1980, pp. 144-145). 
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A is the core of the direct answer, for in bearing R to the one 
true member of X, A provides what was, intuitively, requested by 
Q -- a “singling-out” of PK among the other members of X by 
virtue of R. 
Some answers to an explanation-seeking why-question are better 
than others;  some, in van Fraassen’s words, are more “telling.”  
Van Fraassen (1980, §4.4, esp. pp. 146-147) suggests that an 
answer to Q with core A is telling to the extent that: 
 
(1) Pr(A|K) is high, 
(2) A favors PK, where to favor PK is to maximize the 
difference between Pr(PK|A & K(Q)) (where K(Q) is a 
subset of the background knowledge K), and the 
probabilities of the other propositions in X similarly 
conditionalized, and 
(3) There is no rival to A which is more probable in light of 
K, which favors PK more than A, or which renders A 
statistically irrelevant to PK. 
 
The probabilities in (1)-(3) are presumably to be construed 
subjectively (see Salmon 1989, p. 145). 
Following Kitcher and Salmon’s (1987, pp. 319-320) 
terminology, call maximally telling answers perfect answers, 
questions well-founded to the extent that they admit of telling 
answers, and questions which admit of perfect answers maximally 
well-founded.  Kitcher and Salmon (1987, p. 321) show that for 
any true PK and true A (not necessarily distinct) in K there is a 
Q with PK as its topic such that A is an essential part of a 
perfect answer to Q.  Let A and PK be true members of K and X a 
set of propositions the only true member of which is PK.  Let Z 
be the disjunction of the members of X other than PK, and let K 
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entail ~Z.  Let R be the relation that holds between a 
proposition B and PK just if B entails PK.  Then 
 
B: A • (A --> PK) • ~Z 
 
is the core of a perfect answer to Q, for Pr(B|K) = 1, B entails 
PK and ~Z (and so, in van Fraassen’s (1980, p. 147) words, 
“receives... the highest marks for favoring the topic,”) and no 
other answer to Q can favor PK more strongly or render B 
irrelevant.  What is to be noted here is that A, an essential 
part of the perfect answer to Q, can be any true member of K at 
all, no matter how intuitively irrelevant to PK. 
Kitcher and Salmon offer the following illustration of this 
point (1987, p. 322).  Adapting somewhat from their example, let 
 
PK: JFK died on 11/22/63, 
X: {JFK died on 1/1/63, ... JFK died on 12/31/63, JFK 
survived 1963}, and 
R: Logical consequence, i.e., R holds between A and B just 
if B is a logical consequence of A. 
 
Let A be a true description of the relative position of heavenly 
bodies at the time of JFK’s birth.  Then the question, “Why did 
JFK die on 11/22/63 (rather than on another date in 1963 or not 
at all that year)?” has as a perfect answer 
 
B: A • (If A, then JFK died on 11/22/63) • JFK did not die 
on 1/1/63 • ... • JFK did not die on 11/21/63 • JFK did 
not die on 11/23/63 • ... • JFK did not survive 1963 
(Kitcher and Salmon 1987, 232). 
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an essential part of which is the true description of the 
relative position of various heavenly bodies at the time of 
JFK’s birth.  Obviously, more far-fetched examples can easily be 
conjured. 
Kitcher and Salmon view this result “as a reductio of van 
Fraassen’s account of explanation” (1987, p. 319), and they 
claim that repairing the account requires adding as a fourth 
presupposition of Q, 
 
(d) R is a relevance relation (1987, 322) 
 
which must be satisfied if Q is to not be rejected.ii  (d) is 
intended to permit relations which correspond to objective 
relevance and prohibit those on which A is ‘relevant’ to PK, as 
Salmon puts it, “only in the Pickwickian sense” (1989, p. 141).  
This is, of course, no friendly amendment to van Fraassen’s 
philosophy of science;  the addition of (d) would severely 
compromise his constructive empiricism insofar as it provides a 
way for explanatory power to objectively distinguish empirically 
equivalent theories (Kitcher and Salmon 1987, p. 329). 
The problem-solving account of explanation offered here 
suggests a different response to the kinds of examples Kitcher 
and Salmon offer.  On this view, explanation is the solving of a 
particular kind of problem and understanding is a psychological 
consequence of solving problems of this sort.  “Explanations” 
like the one in the JFK example fail as explanations not because 
the relevance relations they employ are in fact not relevant but 
because they present problems that are, in a sense to be 
discussed below, trivially soluble.  To borrow the expression 
favored by Salmon, these examples pose problems that are 
“solved” only in a Pickwickian sense;  this is why they strike 
us as pseudo-explanations which contribute not at all to our 
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understanding.  Indeed, on the problem-solving account the 
desire to debar explanations which make use of bad science comes 
out as misguided, for when explanation is understood in terms of 
its putative telos, understanding, and understanding is 
understood as the psychological phenomenon it is, we can easily 
see how and in what sense theories that are false, implausible, 
or discredited might nonetheless provide explanations.  As I 
shall argue in Section 4, what is called for instead of Kitcher 
and Salmon’s (d) is a condition requiring of explanation-seeking 
why-questions that the problems they set be non-trivial. 
The examples Kitcher and Salmon offer leave philosophers of 
science with a particular task vis a vis scientific explanation.  
On Kitcher and Salmon’s view, the philosophical task of 
identifying one particular relation (or a small class of 
relations) as the right one in all contexts for purposes of 
scientific explanation finds its place within the more general 
philosophical task of identifying those relations which are not 
explanatorily relevant in any context.  The notion that there is 
one genuine relevance relation (or a small class of such 
relations) operative in scientific explanations independent of 
the context Kitcher and Salmon dub “uniformitarianism.”  
Uniformitarianism shares with “relativism” -- the view that “the 
set of genuine relevance relations [is] a function of the branch 
of science and of the stage of its development” (Kitcher and 
Salmon 1987, p. 325) -- the conviction that “there are some 
relations that are not genuine relevance relations at any 
historical stage of any science” (1987, p. 326).  Identifying 
these pseudorelevance relations is thus the initial 
philosophical task. 
Pragmatism, construed as the view that for any relation there 
is some context in which it is explanatorily relevant, does not 
appear in Kitcher and Salmon’s catalog of philosophical 
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positions.iii  In the next section, I will examine how we should 
approach the task set by Kitcher and Salmon.  A consequence of 
that study is the resuscitation of a thoroughly pragmatic 
account of scientific explanation. 
 
2. Historical Versus Understanding-Based Approaches to the 
Problem of Explanation 
 
In their discussion of the JFK example, Kitcher and Salmon 
dismiss astral influence qua relevance relation because it is at 
odds with our “present lights” concerning how the world works 
(1987, p. 322).  Assessing candidate relevance relations (and 
the explanations that depend on them) in light of current 
science is a common strategy in philosophical discussions of 
explanation, one which gives force to the examples of flagpoles 
(and their shadows), barometers (and storms), and bald school 
board members.  It is in the context of current science, after 
all, that the height of flagpoles explains their shadows (and 
not vice-versa), storms explain barometers (and not vice-versa), 
and school board membership is not (typically) an explanation of 
baldness. 
This use of current science is part of a far more general 
strategy of measuring theories of explanation against the canon 
of recognized scientific achievement -- the body of episodes, 
theories, and experiments that qualify as exemplary science (for 
discussion of this canon see Laudan 1990, p.47, p.53;  for its 
role in testing theories of explanation see Friedman 1974, 
p.13).  A theory of explanation is required to account for the 
instances in this canon -- the more, and the wider the range, 
the better.  For the purposes of this paper, call this approach 
to the problem of scientific explanation the “historical 
approach.”  With respect to the task of identifying relations 
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which never figure in genuine explanations, the historical 
approach amounts to surveying the canon to demonstrate the 
absence of various relations, such as astral influence.  Such 
absence is taken to indicate that astral influence is not a 
genuine relevance relation. 
What other approach could there be to the problem of 
scientific explanation, but to formulate a theory of explanation 
and test it against cases antecedently recognized as extremely 
good (or extremely bad) scientific explanations?  In a well-
known paper, Michael Friedman describes an alternative, an 
approach which uses our notion of scientific understanding to 
“judge the adequacy of philosophical theories of explanation” 
(1973, p.6).  From a demonstration that various theories of 
explanation do not “connect” explanation and understanding, 
Friedman proposes to “extract some general properties a concept 
of scientific understanding ought to have” and to build on this 
“an account of scientific explanation that possesses these 
desirable properties” (1974, p.6;  Salmon (1998, C. 5) has 
lately emphasized the significance of understanding also).  The 
“unificationist” theory of scientific explanation at which 
Friedman arrives in his paper has been the subject of much 
elaboration and discussion (see esp. Kitcher 1976, 1981, 1989, 
and 1993), but my interest here is in Friedman’s approach to the 
problem of scientific explanation, one I will call 
“understanding-based.” iv 
These two approaches to scientific explanation are different, 
but they are not at odds.  In one case we begin with detailed 
scrutiny of scientific practice past and present, good and bad, 
intending to emerge from this study with a compact account of 
explanation which “saves” these instances and, one hopes, 
instances yet to be examined.  In the other we begin with a 
theory of understanding -- its features, function, and relation 
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to other cognitive states -- and build from this a theory of 
what practice or practices promote understanding.  Ideally, 
these two approaches, pursued separately, mesh in the end, i.e., 
the practices that lie behind and promote understanding turn out 
to form a compact description of the instances in the historical 
canon of scientific explanation, and the theory of explanation 
proffered by the historical approach describes a practice which 
promotes understanding on our more sophisticated account of it.  
In the actual world it would be sufficient if the two approaches 
fit together well enough such that from them we have a single 
theory of explanation, aligned with a theory of understanding on 
one hand and an interpretation of the canonical instances of 
scientific explanation on the other.  But the prospect of a 
happy ending should not disguise the fact that the problem of 
scientific explanation has at least two very different starting 
points. 
Other philosophers have recognized that understanding provides 
a path to a theory of scientific explanation.  Paul Churchland, 
for example, proposes that explanatory understanding is 
continuous with perception, and “consists in the activation of a 
particular prototype vector [in the hidden layers of nodes] in a 
well-trained [PDP] network” (1989, 210).  On the basis of this 
view of understanding he proposes a “prototype activation” 
account of scientific explanation:  explanation is the 
activation of a prototype vector constitutive of understanding 
in a network of parallel distributed processors like we might 
well find in the brain. 
What is missing from Churchland’s account, and from Friedman’s 
as well, is a plausible theory of human understanding.  
Churchland’s claim that understanding just is the activation of 
a prototype vector is puzzling at best, for Churchland offers no 
reason why understanding should be so construed -- no empirical 
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support for the claim that understanding and prototype 
activation are correlated, and no argument for why the 
activation of a prototype vector (rather than another of the 
trillions of vectors that might be activated) should be 
associated with understanding. Friedman, on the other hand, 
never delivers the general properties of scientific 
understanding he promises;  he settles instead for “three 
desirable properties that a theory of explanation should have” 
(1974, p. 13;  emphasis added).  The third of these properties 
is that the account of explanation “somehow connect explanation 
and understanding -- it should tell us what kind of 
understanding scientific explanations provide and how they 
provide it” (1974, p. 14).  But in Friedman’s paper, 
pretheoretic intuitions about when we have understanding and 
when we don’t take the place of a theory of understanding 
against which we might measure an account of explanation.v 
Short-circuited attempts at an understanding-based approach to 
explanation should not warn us off the approach itself.  On the 
contrary, the understanding-based approach is a relatively 
untried and promising one, provided it can make use of a 
plausible theory of understanding.  In the following section, I 
sketch a theory of understanding and present an account of 
scientific explanation inspired by it. 
 
3. A Problem-Solving Account of Scientific Explanation 
 
Human understanding is a rich and varied psychological 
phenomenon, to say the least (for a taxonomy of types of 
understanding, see Salmon (1998)).  We can get some handle on 
the notion by considering some features of our “everyday,” or 
pretheoretic, concept of understanding. 
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First, understanding on our usual, pretheoretic, notion is a 
cognitive state, rather than a cognitive capacity or process.  
We talk of “coming to understand,” “gaining an understanding,” 
“having (and loosing) an understanding,” and of “almost (but not 
quite) understanding”;  implicit in all of this talk is the idea 
that to understand X is to stand in some relation to X, i.e. 
some state, rather than to go through a series of states (i.e. a 
process) or to be able to bring about some state (a capacity).  
This is not to claim that understanding cannot be (or is not 
often) the result of a process, nor that there are not 
capacities for understanding;  either of these claims is 
consistent with regarding understanding as a state.  Nor is it 
quite to claim that processes or capacities may not themselves 
be ultimately characterized as states;  the point is simply that 
understanding is typically regarded as a state, not a process or 
capacity. 
Within the notion of cognitive state there is considerable 
leeway.  Understanding may, for example, presumably be 
alternately standing or occurrent, in the way that a belief or 
desire may be standing sometimes, occurrent others.  Perhaps 
understanding in the usual sense is semantically evaluable in 
the way that beliefs and some other cognitive states are, but 
this is less clear.  Most theories of explanation bar 
“explanations” in which the explanans (or, in the erotetic 
framework, the answer) are false, presumably on the grounds that 
such “false explanations” would provide false understanding, and 
that notion is incoherent.  To understand at all is to 
understand on the basis of truth, or, at least, not on the basis 
of falsehoods.  Accordingly, understanding at least involves 
semantically evaluable (specifically, true) states, if it is not 
one itself.  The account of explanation offered here does not 
quite follow this line, though, for reasons discussed below. 
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Second, understanding in its pretheoretical guise is discrete:  
one either understands X or one does not.  Prima facie this is 
false, for we speak of gradual understanding and degrees of 
understanding, and of understanding something more, or better 
than, someone else.  Indeed, several philosophers have presumed 
that understanding is not discrete.  On Churchland’s account, 
for example, understanding is the activation of a prototype 
vector and activated vectors can be nearer or farther from a 
prototype;  thus one might understand X in degrees.  And Kitcher 
(1985, p. 633) suggests classifying explanations as more or less 
complete on the grounds that “there are degrees of 
understanding, and of ununderstanding”;  an ideally complete 
explanation eliminates all our ununderstanding. 
However, instances of understanding which initially appear 
non-discrete typically break down, upon analysis, into discrete 
components.  Thus the gradually increased understanding one 
might have of a combustion engine, for example, is on analysis 
the accumulation of a set of discrete understandings -- of the 
fuel system, cooling system, exhaust system, etc., for example.  
This is probably too coarse even;  understanding an electrical 
system, for example, is accumulating discrete understandings of 
other, simpler, phenomena.  Our talk about understanding 
reflects its discrete character too, for we talk of 
understanding in a “flash” or an “instant”, and we distinguish 
between those who do and those who do not understand something.  
The persistent fact that putatively gradual understandings can 
typically be analyzed into discrete components speaks against 
giving weight to talk of degrees of understanding, and suggests 
instead that we construe understanding X more (or less) as 
understanding, discretely, more (or fewer) of X’s components. 
Finally, understanding is, phenomenologically, both surprising 
and pleasant.  These are not obvious features of our ordinary 
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notion of understanding, and some care must be taken to 
disentangle them from some obvious truths about understanding.  
To begin with, this feature is not implied by understanding’s 
status as a discrete state, for an arrival at a discrete state 
need not be phenomenologically sudden or surprising.  A train at 
a platform is in a discrete state, but its arrival there is no 
surprise to those who watched it come down the track and into 
the station.  However, understanding is surprising;  it is like 
a train that suddenly appears at the station.  It is not, for 
that, necessarily unexpected.  One can stare at a proof for 
hours, knowing that eventually its workings will stand forth 
clearly.  Still, the grasp of the proof comes, when it does 
come, suddenly and despite this expectation.  This is a 
prevalent feature of understanding. 
We must also distinguish the effect of understanding that X 
from the effect of simply understanding.  Often the two are 
similar, as when for example when one grasps that the coins 
inherited from a deceased relative are untarnished because they 
are gold.  There is in this case some pleasure had as a result 
of understanding why these coins have not tarnished, and much 
more from the realization of an impending financial windfall.  
In cases where we are indifferent or adverse to that which we 
come to understand, though, the pleasurable aspect of 
understanding remains.  Thus there is some pleasure even in 
understanding that a range of diverse physical symptoms mark the 
onset of a terminal illness, or in grasping that one’s spouse 
has been unfaithful, to take to examples where what is 
understood causes us great sorrow.  But still, in either case 
there is a new understanding, and that in itself brings a 
pleasurable satisfaction.  However, that pleasure is hardly 
noticeable when it is overshadowed by what we come to understand 
(cf. Salmon 1989, p. 90). 
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Understanding as we conceive it pretheoretically is thus at 
least a discrete, surprising, and pleasant psychological state.  
In her recent discussion of the phenomenology of scientific 
explanation, Alison Gopnik (1998) arrives at an account of what 
“it is like to... have an explanation” (p. 108) that coincides 
at many points with the account I’ve presented.  What Gopnik 
calls the “aha” of explanation is, she says, surprising, 
satisfying, pleasurable, and “strikingly domain general” (pp. 
108-110).  Gopnik argues that the distinctive and enjoyable 
phenomenology associated with having an explanation is a 
byproduct of selection;  specifically, the promise of 
explanation functions to motivate the activation of our “theory-
formation system,” which in turn contributes to fitness, in the 
same way that the promise of orgasm motivates intercourse, 
participation in which contributes to fitness.  The details (and 
some of the main points) of Gopnik’s more general account are at 
odds with what I argue here, but with respect to our accounts of 
the effect of explanation there is, I think, considerable 
agreement. 
A psychological state very similar to what I have 
characterized as understanding has been the subject of a series 
of “insight” studies conducted by Janet Metcalfe and David Wiebe 
(1986a, 1986b, 1987).  In one experiment Metcalfe and Wiebe 
asked subjects to solve five high school algebra problems, one 
at a time, and at fifteen-second intervals while they worked 
indicate “their feeling of warmth (i.e., their perceived 
closeness of solution)” by placing a slash to the left or the 
right of a 3 cm scale, depending upon whether they judged 
themselves to be near or far, respectively, from the solution.  
The subjects were then presented with a series of five “insight” 
problems, that is, problems which researchers have historically 
regarded as requiring insight or illumination for solution (the 
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algebra problems, in contrast, were deemed “grind-out-the-
solution” problems demanding no significant insight).  In one 
insight problem (from deBono 1969), for example, subjects were 







and asked to “show how you can move three circles to get the 
triangle [formed by the dots] to point to the bottom of the 
page” (1987, p. 245). 
In Metcalfe and Wiebe’s study, algebra and insight problems 
were associated with different patterns of warmth ratings 
respectively.  Subjects tended to judge themselves far from the 
solution of an insight problem until seconds before they 
actually solved it, while subjects judged themselves 
progressively nearer the solution as they solved an algebra 
problem.  Patterns of warmth ratings for each problem type in 
the last minute of problem-solving are shown in Figure 1.  Here 
the difference between insight and non-insight problems is 
graphically represented;  for the former but not the latter the 
solution comes unexpectedly.  The trend suggested by Figure 1 is 
borne out under statistical analysis; non-insight 
 
------------------------------- 
Figure 1 about here 
------------------------------- 
 
problems were significantly correlated with feeling of warmth 
patterns that gradually shifted to the right, and insight 
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problems with patterns that shifted abruptly, p ≤ .05.vi  
Metcalfe and Wiebe conclude that “the phenomenology of insight 
problem solution [is] characterized by a sudden, unforeseen 
flash of illumination” (238). 
One central contention of the account of explanation offered 
here is that the “sudden, unforeseen flash of illumination” 
identified by Metcalfe and Wiebe just is understanding as it was 
characterized above.  Metcalfe and Wiebe’s way of describing 
their data suggests as much.  Indeed, Metcalfe and Wiebe 
motivate this work by associating insight with scientific 
discovery and, following Robert Sternberg, with “significant and 
exceptional intellectual accomplishment -- for example, major 
scientific discoveries, new and important inventions, and new 
and significant understandings of major literary, philosophical, 
and similar work”  (Sternberg 1985, p. 282, cited in Metcalfe 
and Wiebe 1987, p. 238).  This coincidence of insight as 
Metcalfe and Wiebe locate it and the aim of scientific 
explanation as we described it above does not imply that 
Metcalfe and Wiebe’s subjects were engaging in scientific 
explanations;  plainly, they were not.  Our understanding of the 
process that results in insight or understanding will have to be 
refined if we are to build a theory of explanation on this 
basis.  The fact that insight and understanding are discrete 
states of very similar phenomenology is only the motivation for 
that refinement. 
The first step in appreciating the theory of understanding 
suggested by the proposed identification of insight and 
understanding is a consideration of Metcalfe and Wiebe’s study 
in the broader context of the study of human problem-solving.  
Following Newell and Simon (1972), problem-solving has typically 
been understood as a search through a “problem-space.”  Problem-
spaces are defined in terms of an “initial state” SI;  a desired 
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“goal state” SG;  a set of “operators” {O1, O2, O3, ... ON} which 
applied to one state bring about another;  and a set of “path 
constraints,” for example, that the goal state be obtained with 
the least cost or in the least number of steps (Holyoak 1992, 
pp. 269-270).  A problem-space can be represented with circles 
for states and arrows for operators.  Solving the problem 




Figure 2 about here 
------------------------- 
 
of O2 (which brings about State 3) followed by an application of 
O1 (which brings about SG).  Representing a problem in this way 
makes vivid the idea of problem solving as a search;  it also 
vindicates metaphors we use for problem-solving, metaphors like 
“hitting a dead end,” “going roundabout to the solution,” or 
“going in circles.” 
The construal of problems as searches in a problem-space 
suggests a number of problem-solving strategies.  One, described 
by Newell and Simon (1972), directs a solver to calculate the 
“distance” between the goal state and the present state and 
apply operators which decrease this distance.  Such a “means-
ends” analysis may characterize how we solve a large class of 
problems, but, as Metcalfe and Wiebe point out, it is an 
inadequate account of the approach subjects take to the problems 
characterized above as insight problems.  If subjects’ warmth 
ratings reflect the distance between a current state and the 
goal state, then solving an insight problem looks more like a 
dramatic leap to the solution than a methodical navigation 
through a problem-space.  Indeed, Metcalfe and Wiebe’s work on 
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insight problems has led them, and others, to question whether 
problem solving is always a matter of searching a problem-space.  
Keith Holyoak, for example, suggests that Metcalfe and Wiebe’s 
experiments show that problem solving is sometimes a matter of 
defining an ill-defined problem or of restructuring a problem-
space (Holyoak 1992, pp. 286-287), and Metcalfe and Wiebe note 
that their data support the view that insight problems are 
solved by “some nonanalytical, sudden process” (p. 239).  The 
sudden arrival at a solution to an insight problem is, on these 
interpretations, a result of abruptly seeing the problem 
differently such that a solution is almost immediately available 
(Holyoak 1995, pp. 286-287;  Metcalfe and Wiebe pp. 239, 243;  
Cf. Chi 1992). 
This is, however, not the only interpretation of Metcalfe and 
Wiebe’s data, nor is it the most plausible one.  Metcalfe’s and 
Wiebe’s data allows for the interpretation that subjects merely 
have no conscious access to the strategies they in fact use to 
solve insight problems, and this is consistent with taking 
solutions to insight problems to be navigations of a problem-
space rather than giant leaps across, or dramatic restructurings 
of, that space.  Indeed, this interpretation coheres with 
Metcalfe and Wiebe’s (1987, p. 242) conclusion elsewhere that 
subjects have no privileged access to information that enables 
them to predict their success at solving insight problems.  
Moreover, even if we allow that the characteristic feature of 
insight problems is that solving them involves discovering or 
restructuring a problem-space, that restructuring itself might 
be modeled as a search in a broader space, a “meta” problem-
space.  There is therefore less reason to adopt Metcalfe and 
Wiebe’s interpretation of their experiments.  Rather than 
involving dramatic restructurings or leaps of logic, the 
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characteristic feature of insight problems is merely that their 
solution comes, for the solver, unexpectedly. 
I have argued that insight and understanding ought to be 
regarded as the same phenomenon, and that the cognitive tasks 
that elicit insight should therefore be understood as searches 
through a problem-space, albeit searches distinguished by the 
solver’s lack of conscious access the solution (i.e. SG), however 
imminent.  Conjoined with the identification of understanding 
and insight, we arrive at the view that that understanding is a 
discrete psychological state, phenomenologically surprising and 
pleasant, produced in the wake of solving an insight problem.  
How then might this rudimentary theory of understanding 
underwrite a theory of explanation? 
Metcalfe and Wiebe’s insight problems are not explanation-
seeking why-questions, but explanation-seeking why-questions can 
be cast as insight problems of a certain form.  The second 
central contention of the problem-solving account of explanation 
is that explanation is the solving of an insight problem which 
has been formed on the basis of an explanation-seeking why-
question.  Call such problems “explanation-seeking problems.”   
Combining the representation of problems shown in Figure 2 with 
the formal erotetic apparatus from Section 1, we can help 
ourselves to a perspicuous representation of this second 
contention.  Let <PK, X, R> be an explanation-seeking why-
question, and let R = {<A, <PK, X>>}, where A is a true 
proposition.  Although this explanation request mentions R, and 
A may even be a member of the background knowledge K, a request 
for an explanation is typically made in contexts in which the 
fact that A bears R to <PK, X> is either not recognized or not 
appreciated.  Giving the explanation is at least a matter of 
singling PK out from among the rest of X by means of discovering 
the proposition which bears R to PK.vii  The explanation-seeking 
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problem and its solution can be represented as a problem-space, 
in which the initial state SI is associated with the expression 
‘<?, <PK, X>>’ (where ‘?’ is a variable taking propositions as 
values) and SG is associated with the expression ‘<A, <PK, X>>’.  
The replacement of the names of various propositions for the 
variable in ‘<?, <PK, X>>’ comprise the various operators;  thus 
intermediate states are associated with such expressions as ‘<B, 
<PK, X>>’, ‘<C, <PK, X>>’, etc.  The member of R relevant to the 
question at hand represented in the problem-space as well, as SG.  
A portion of a problem-space for an explanation-seeking problem 
is represented in Figure 3.  Unlike 
 
---------------------------------- 
Figure 3 about here. 
---------------------------------- 
 
the problem-space depicted in Figure 3, typical explanation-
seeking problems will have more states and thus more complex 
problem-spaces.  But, as in this simple case, each will pose 
some specific version of the scientific question ‘<?, <PK, X>>’ 
as an expression to be “solved,” i.e., to be completed by 
identifying a proposition bearing R to <PK, X>. 
To summarize:  on the problem-solving account of scientific 
explanation explanations are navigations of those problem-spaces 
associated with explanation-seeking problems.  Scientific 
understanding is the payoff for accomplishing an explanation, 
which is to say, it is the psychological state attained as a 
result of solving an insight problem.  As should be clear, 
understanding is not on this account an additional sort of 
knowledge, but neither is it an entirely subjective feature of 
scientific practice. 
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In the following section I will consider some objections and 
consequences of this account, including how it handles two tasks 
which any theory of scientific explanation must address -- the 
problem of rejected requests for explanation and the problem of 
explanatory asymmetry. 
 
4. Rejections and Asymmetries 
A theory of explanation must account for legitimate rejections 
of putative requests for explanation, and it must handle 
asymmetries of explanation, exemplified usually in the case of 
the flagpole and its shadow (van Fraassen 1980, pp. 132-134;  
cf. Kitcher and Salmon 1987, pp. 315-317).  How well does the 
problem-solving account do with these problems? 
Consider rejections first.  The problem-solving account 
construes a request for explanation as the setting of a problem, 
defined in erotetic terms.  For each problem then there is a 
topic PK, a contrast class X, and a relation R.  The problem-
solving account thus enjoys the considerable success of van 
Fraassen’s account in ruling out inappropriate requests for 
explanation.  Specifically, we can say that an explanation 
request is appropriate in a given context with background 
knowledge K on the problem-solving account only if PK is true on 
K, the other members of X are false on K, and K does not entail 
that no A bears R to <PK, X>.  By analogy with the erotetic 
account, (a), (b), and (c) can be regarded as presuppositions of 
an explanation-seeking problem. 
For explanation-seeking problems where (a) or (b) are not 
satisfied but (c) is we have a weakened but wholly familiar 
sense of explanation, namely the sense in which a falsehood is 
explained by some other facts.  The problem-solving account of 
explanation accommodates such cases, for when (a) or (b) are not 
satisfied, but (c) is, there is still a problem to be solved, 
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that is, there is still a well-defined problem-space, the 
successful navigation of which provides understanding.  
Accordingly, let us call explanation-seeking problems for which 
(a) or (b) are not satisfied, but (c) is, fictional explanation-
seeking problems, and their solutions fictional explanations.  
There is no sense of explanation available when (c) is not 
satisfied, for the requirement that our background knowledge not 
entail that no A bears R to <PK, X> translates on the problem-
solving account to the requirement that K not entail that the 
explanation-seeking problem has no solution.  If (c) is not 
satisfied we have an insoluble problem, which in the sense 
employed here does not qualify as a problem at all. 
The imposition of (a)-(c) is necessary, but not sufficient, if 
the problem-solving account is to handle for legitimate 
rejections of explanation requests.  If the passage from initial 
to goal state in an explanation-seeking problem is so simple as 
to be a search in only a technical “Pickwickian” sense, then 
there is no understanding, and no explanation.  Certainly this 
is true in the degenerate case, in which initial and goal state 
are identical, but slightly richer problem-spaces with two nodes 
or one or two operations can, similarly, be expected to provide 
no understanding upon solution.  This suggests adding to (a)-(c) 
 
(d’) The (explanation-seeking) problem is a nontrivial 
insight problem.  
 
where insight problems are defined in the way suggested in the 
previous section.  The triviality of a problem can be explicated 
in terms of its problem-space;  more trivial problems will 
presumably have fewer intermediate states and fewer basic 
operators available to move between those states, and thus will 
have overall less complex paths to the goal state.  The analysis 
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of triviality can be tackled empirically as well, with error 
rates and time to solution studies as a function of problem-
space complexity.  Problem-spaces of a complexity associated 
with very low times to solution and error rates would then be 
identified as trivial.  This empirical research is required if 
the problem-solving account is to be articulated in detail;  
prior to it we have only our intuitions to guide us in sorting 
trivial from non-trivial problems.  However, in the cases which 
will concern us I will take it as given that explanation-seeking 
problems with only one or two or operators are clearly trivial. 
We should also note here that the triviality of problems is 
presumably partly independent of their character as insight 
problems;  there are, for example, complex non-insight problems.  
The problem-solving account does conjecture that no trivial 
problems are insight problems, however.  Thus aside from 
empirical studies of when a problem becomes trivial, the 
problem-solving account suggests empirical studies of insight, 
such as the relation of insight to problem complexity just noted 
and the question of whether all appropriate explanation-seeking 
problems are also insight problems, as the problem-solving 
account claims.  Although the problem-solving account may be 
refuted by these studies, I regard its reliance on them as an 
advantage for a theory of explanation and understanding, both of 
which are human endeavors. 
On the basis of (d’) we can diagnose the cases presented by 
Kitcher and Salmon, cases which they claim show that R must be 
an objective relevance relation.  Recall that in their examples 
the lack of constraint placed on R by van Fraassen is exploited 
to show how to construct what is, on van Fraassen’s account, an 
exemplary explanation of PK on the basis of A for any true PK and 
A in K.  Only with the addition of (d) to the conditions an 
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explanation-seeking why-question must meet if it is to arise, 
they claim, can this reductio be avoided. 
On the problem-solving account, as we have just seen, being a 
maximally telling answer to an explanation-seeking why-question 
is not enough to be the core of a proper explanation.  The 
answer must also be arrived at as the solution to an insight 
problem.  Otherwise, there is according to the problem-solving 
account no understanding and no explanation.  But in Kitcher and 
Salmon’s examples a non-trivial search for the proposition 
bearing R to <PK, X> is precluded by Kitcher and Salmon’s 
explicit presentation of this proposition as the question’s 
answer in the course of describing the example.  It is trivial 
to determine what proposition bears the “astral influence” 
relation to the proposition that JFK died on 11/22/63 when we 
are told at the start that R consists of “ordered pairs of 
descriptions of the positions of the stars and planets at the 
time of a person’s birth and propositions about that person’s 
fate” (Kitcher and Salmon 1987, p. 322).  From this initial 
state it is a small step to the goal state, in which A is seen 
to stand in R to <PK, X>.  In terms of the problem-solving 
account, in this example Kitcher and Salmon present a trivial 
explanation-seeking problem, one in which the move from initial 
to goal state has no intervening states.  The nature of R, 
astral influence in this case, is quite beside the point. 
Consider another of Kitcher and Salmon’s examples, in which 
they aim to show that a particular worry for Hempel’s “covering 
law” account of explanation (Hempel 1965, p. 339) resurfaces on 
van Fraassen’s account.  Let PK be that Horace is bald as PK, X 
be {PK, ~PK}, A the conjunctive proposition that Horace is a 
member of the Greenbury School Board and all members of the 
Greenbury School Board are bald, and R 
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the relation of Greenbury-school-board-derivation that 
holds between A and PK just in case A is a conjunction of 
propositions one of whose conjuncts is the proposition that 
Horace belongs to the Greenbury school Board, PK is 
derivable from A, and there is no conjunct in A that could 
be deleted while still enabling PK to be derivable from the 
result. (1987, 327) 
 
Provided A and PK are true members of K, Horace’s membership on 
the Greenbury School Board figures essentially in an exemplary 
explanation of his baldness.  But from the point of view of the 
problem-solving approach, the relevant explanation-seeking 
problem is trivial.  As in the previous case, the problem is 
presented such that the answer’s core, A, and the information 
that A is the answer to the question, are given explicitly.  The 
task of completing the expression <?, <PK, X>> requires a search 
of one step, from initial state to goal state.  This is why 
“solving” the explanation-seeking problem (or, in erotetic 
terms, answering the explanation-seeking why-question) produces 
no understanding. 
The problem-solving account agrees with Kitcher and Salmon 
that these cases contain no explanations, but disagrees with 
their diagnosis.  The difference can be expressed in more 
general terms.  On the problem-solving account, explanation is 
dynamic -- it requires intellectual work, in the form of motion 
from an initial to a goal state in a non-trivial problem-space.  
Understanding is the product of such work.  In these terms, the 
Kitcher/Salmon cases fail as explanations not because they 
employ illegitimate relevance relations, but because in them the 
dynamic element required for explanation is missing, due to the 
triviality of the problems. 
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It is important to note that the diagnosis of Kitcher and 
Salmon’s examples just offered does not turn only on the fact 
that A is included in the presentation of the explanation-
seeking problem.  The point is that the problems posed in their 
examples are trivial;  and the inclusion of A in the setting of 
the explanation-seeking question, while necessary, is not 
sufficient to make a problem trivial.  Thus the problem-solving 
account avoids objections which turn on explanations with 
explanans and explananda with which are already quite familiar. 
Behind this objection lurks another.  The problem-solving 
account locates explanation in that process which produces 
understanding, and it identifies this process as the solving of 
an explanation-seeking insight problem.  But, goes the 
objection, scientific explanation so construed is at odds with 
scientific explanation as we understand it.  Presumably the 
“sudden, unforeseen flash of illumination” had upon solving an 
insight problem is less prominent upon solving the same problem 
subsequent times.  But explanations do not decay, no matter how 
often we apply or cite them.  The purported difference is 
clearest in pedagogical contexts, when a teacher conveys an 
explanation to students.  The teacher traces a problem solution 
with which she is likely all too familiar.  Students following 
the problem solution for the first time experience the sudden 
illumination and insight;  the teacher does not.  Are we to say 
that the teacher no longer has an explanation, or that what was 
once an explanation for her has ceased to be one?  Clearly not, 
goes the objection; explanation is thus not the same as solving 
a problem. 
There is some truth to this objection, for surely the 
experience of solving an explanation-seeking problem is more 
vibrant and illuminating for students solving it for the first 
time than for a teacher retracing familiar steps.  However, it 
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is not appropriate to describe subsequent solvings of an insight 
problem as devoid of the sudden illumination that characterizes 
a first solution, and it may even be the case that subsequent 
solvings retain a substantial portion of the initial 
phenomenology.  This seems to be the case for sample insight 
problems used in Metcalfe and Wiebe’s study.  The psychological 
“charge” of the sudden illumination one has when seeing which 
three dots to move in the diagram above, and where to move them, 
can be recaptured by recalling the problem and its solution.  
Even the weariest science teacher, I propose, can in a similar 
fashion recapture the sudden illumination associated with an 
explanation, and this indeed is what keeps it an explanation. 
Conversely, we should recognize that what strikes us at one 
time as an explanation may in time strike us as something less 
than an explanation -- for example, a simple description of the 
world which does not contribute to our understanding of it at 
all.  Initially, for example, we may explain why this penny 
conducts electricity by noting that it is made of copper, that 
all copper conducts electricity, and that these facts entail 
that the penny conducts electricity.  In time we may see this 
same structure as nothing more than an assemblage of facts. 
The response I have suggested to this objection works on two 
fronts:  it suggests that explanations need not loose their 
phenomenological character over repeated use, and on the other 
hand that over many uses explanations may loose their 
distinctive explanatory character.  Jointly these two replies 
show us how to reconcile the dynamic character of explanation as 
the problem-solving account describes it with explanation’s 
static aspects. 
At this point we can also note the manner in which the 
problem-solving account is a pragmatic theory of explanation.  
Explanation-seeking problems are to be rejected when they fail 
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to satisfy (a)-(d’).  The condition (d’) is effectively 
independent of the relevance relation specified in the 
explanation-seeking problem, and so on the problem-solving 
account nearly any relevance relation can figure in an 
appropriate explanation-seeking problem.  In particular, whether 
a relevance relation describes an objective relation between 
aspects of the world, as Kitcher and Salmon require, is 
independent of whether it might figure in a non-trivial problem.  
The problem-solving account is thus a pragmatic account of 
explanation in the sense outlined at the start of this paper, 
for on it whether a particular relation of explanatory relevance 
is appropriate in a given context depends upon contingent facts 
about the desires, interests, and capacities of the people who 
produce and consume the explanation.  The problem-solving 
account does not address relevance relations as such, but it is 
concerned instead with whether they appear as components of non-
trivial problems.  Moreover, the facts about the consumers and 
producers of explanations to which it makes reference are 
presumably fairly deep and universal facts about human problem-
solving, as well as more transient facts about current aims, 
desires, or tastes.  Thus it is not the case that on the 
problem-solving account explanation is “whatever S counts as an 
explanation,” or “whatever satisfies S’s curiosity”.  The 
problem-solving account rules out no proposed relations of 
explanatory relevance, in principle, and it does refer to wholly 
contingent features of human cognition.  But it is not an 
“anything goes” theory of explanation. 
Let us turn to the asymmetries of explanation.  Sometimes one 
feature of the world is used to explain another, but not vice-
versa.  Hempel (1965, p. 352) noted that a pendulum’s length 
explained its period while its period did not explain its 
length, but the more famous example, attributed to Sylvain 
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Bromberger (see Salmon 1989, 47), is of a flagpole and its 
shadow:  the height of a flagpole (along with facts about light, 
the position of the sun, etc.) explains the length of its 
shadow, but the length of the shadow (along with the same facts) 
does not explain the flagpole’s height.  The task facing a 
theory of explanation is to track this difference;  i.e., to 
reconstruct the explanation in one direction, the intuitively 
sanctioned one, but not the other. 
As simple as the task sounds, it could not be accomplished in 
Hempel’s covering law account of explanation.  In that account a 
simple exchange of premise and conclusion in the relevant 
argument suffices to turn the derivation of the statement 
asserting the length of the shadow from statements describing 
the height of the flagpole, other initial conditions, and 
various physical laws, into an equally acceptable derivation of 
the height of the tower from the length of the shadow.  The 
covering law account was unable to recognize only the former 
explanation as legitimate;  thus it offered two symmetrical 
explanations where it was expected to track a purported 
asymmetry (see Salmon 1989, p. 47, and 1998, and also Richardson 
(1994) for accounts of the challenge posed to the covering law 
account by this and other asymmetries of explanation).  How does 
the problem-solving account fare with the same example? 
Explanatory asymmetry arises only when (1) a theory presents 
us with explanations which are, on that theory, sufficiently 
(and perhaps even formally) similar to warrant being called 
symmetrical, and in which (2) these two explanations are prima 
facie of dramatically different explanatory worth.  Thus there 
are two distinct strategies for responding to the problem when 
it arises.  If (2) is granted (in a particular case), then the 
theory of explanation at hand must be altered so that the 
explanations the theory presented as symmetrical are no longer 
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presented as such by the theory.  For example, the moral many 
are inclined to drawn from the flagpole case is that the 
relation of explanatory relevance is causation, and that the 
covering law account should be modified so that the derivation 
of the flagpole’s height from its shadow (and some laws and 
initial conditions) no longer counts as an explanation, on the 
grounds that it does not respect the causal facts of the matter 
(e.g. Humphreys 1989).viii 
Attractive as this strategy may be, it is not available to the 
problem-solving account.  To see this, we must first appreciate 
that, as Kitcher and Salmon show, an “explanation” of the 
flagpole’s height on the basis of the length of its shadow can 
be easily constructed within van Fraassen’s account.  Let PK be a 
proposition ascribing to the flagpole its actual height, X a set 
of false propositions ascribing other heights, A a proposition 
ascribing to the shadow its actual length, and R the relation of 
“censored Hempelian derivation -- a relation that holds between 
A and <PK, X> just in case there is a D-N argument that derives 
PK from A plus additional premises in [a subset of K] K(Q)” 
(Kitcher and Salmon 1987, 328;  see Richardson (1995) for a 
critique).  Then the proposition ascribing to the shadow its 
actual length is the core of the maximally telling answer to the 
question of why the flagpole is as high as it is;  i.e., the 
shadow’s length explains the flagpole’s height. 
The explanation-seeking problem founded on the question <PK, 
X, R> will not obviously be inappropriate.  The conditions (a)-
(c) are satisfied, by hypothesis.  There is good reason to think 
(d’) is satisfied as well, not because the explanation-seeking 
problem involves the use of complex relations and computation 
(which it does), but because if (d’) were not satisfied, then 
(d’) would not be satisfied for the explanation-seeking problem 
which sought the explanation of the shadow’s length on the basis 
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of the flagpole’s height.  As explanation-seeking problems, 
these two are symmetrical.  Of course, (d’) could turn out to 
not be satisfied by either problem, and in various ways they 
could (each) be rendered trivial.  The point is that, on the 
problem-solving account, the two stand or fall together. 
The alternative response to asymmetry cases, and the response 
I claim is the right one in defense of the problem-solving 
account, is to accept (1) and deny (2);  that is, to claim that 
the explanations the theory regards as symmetrical do in fact 
have equivalent explanatory value.ix  It should be noted that it 
is easy to overlook the explanatory equivalence of symmetrical 
explanations if we appraise them, inappropriately, in light of 
pairs of different, asymmetrical, explanations.  So, for 
example, if we let the appeal of a causal explanation of the 
length of the flagpole’s shadow in terms of its height influence 
our comparison of two symmetrical covering law explanations, 
both of which cite inferential rather than causal connections, 
and if consequently we regard the covering law explanation of 
the shadow’s length on the basis of the flagpole’s height as 
having more explanatory power than its partner, we create the 
impression of a problem of explanatory asymmetry where no such 
problem may exist.  The two covering law explanations may be of 
exactly the same explanatory worth.  This point is easily lost 
sight of when we recognize only a single relation of explanatory 
relevance. 
This clears the way for the problem-solving account to handle 
explanatory asymmetries.  If we take care to compare only 
explanations which are genuinely symmetrical on the problem-
solving account, then we can accept what the account suggests, 
namely that both these explanations are explanations -- neither 
is to be rejected.  If a determination of the length of the 
shadow given its height (and other assorted facts) explains that 
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length on the problem-solving account, then in the same way and 
to the same extent the shadow’s length explains the flagpole’s 
height.  It is quite consistent with this to claim that neither 
explanation provides much in the way of understanding, and to 
prefer to either one an explanation which appeals to causal 
relations.  But this is not to show that the problem-solving 
account fails to accommodate an explanatory asymmetry. 
 
5.  Conclusion 
 
This presentation and defense of the problem-solving account 
of scientific explanation has considered several issues 
surrounding explanation, including issues, like the character of 
understanding and the relation between understanding and 
explanation, that have, in my view, been neglected in 
philosophical examinations of explanation. 
Still, if the problem-solving account is to be regarded as a 
serious candidate theory of scientific explanation, much 
philosophical work remains.  I have not compared the problem-
solving account with causal theories or unificationist theories, 
for example, and there is the range of empirical work on insight 
and complexity, mentioned in Section 3 that the account 
requires.  In this paper my aim has been to set forth and 
motivate a new and thoroughly pragmatic theory of scientific 
explanation and argue that this new account answers to the 
initial (albeit quite severe) hurdles we set for any such 
theory.  That it survives these severe tests, answers the 
objections raised previously against pragmatic accounts, and 
(most of all) does so while forging a deep link between 
explanation and understanding, is reason enough, I hope, to 
warrant its further study from different historical, 
sociological, and philosophical perspectives. 






i Like many theorists of scientific explanation, I presume in 
this paper that the aim of (scientific) explanation is 
(scientific) understanding.  On my view, the converse claim -- 
that understanding is always the result of explanation -- is 
denied;  understanding, as we will see, can and does arise in 
non-scientific contexts.  For a stronger denial of this 
converse claim, to wit that we sometimes understand something 
that we cannot explain (but for which a request for 
explanation is appropriate), see Rescher (1970, pp. 133-134), 
cited in Salmon (1989, p. 93). 
ii  Alternatively, the import of (d) could be made a condition 
upon answers to Q, with the result that questions making 
reference to a pseudorelevance relation would arise but have 
no answer.  There is some unclarity in Kitcher and Salmon 
(1987) on this point, for they describe (d) as an additional 
condition “on answers to why-questions” (1987, p. 322), yet 
their notation suggests that what they offer is a new 
presupposition of Q to be satisfied if Q arises in a context.  
The latter option is in the spirit of their admonition against 
“silly questions” (p. 322) and is how Salmon presents (d) 
(1989, p. 143). 
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iii As Kitcher and Salmon (1987, p. 326) note, van Fraassen is not 
sympathetic to pragmatism so construed either. 
iv A narrower sense of understanding, usually termed ‘verstehen’, 
has figured prominently in discussions of the social sciences 
since Dilthey (see Dilthey (1961) and Winch (1990) for 
representative discussions, and Salmon, M. (1989) for an 
overview).  Understanding will come in for a more detailed 
characterization below, but it is worth noting now that 
understanding in the sense employed here is to be 
distinguished from verstehen at least by being applicable to 
natural phenomena beyond human actions and by being 
characteristic of all sciences, indeed, all inquiry. 
v Other philosophical discussions of understanding are no more 
promising in this regard.  Hempel’s many references to 
“scientific understanding” contrasted to “empathetic 
understanding” (e.g. 1965, pp. 161-163, 239-240, 257-258, p. 
329) were followed by suggestive but cryptic explications of 
the former notion.  Salmon’s recent (1998) discussion of 
understanding offers a taxonomy of types of understanding but 
does not venture toward an account of what ties these types 
together, i.e., toward a theory of understanding.  Achinstein 
(1983), on the other hand, proposes that it is a necessary and 
sufficient condition for A to understand q that there exists a 
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proposition p which is both a “complete content-giving 
proposition with respect to Q” and known by A to be a correct 
answer to Q (1983, p. 42;  see also Salmon 1989, pp. 147-148).  
But, as Salmon (1989, p. 147) points out, the notion of a 
“correct answer” remains unexplicated.  So too, then does 
“understanding” on Achinstein’s account. 
For a recent and far more fecund discussion of 
understanding, motivated by work in developmental psychology, 
see Gopnik (1998), discussed below. 
vi Subject’s “feeling of knowing,” as measured by either their 
presolution estimation of the probability that they would 
solve a given problem or their ranking of problems according 
to which ones they felt they were most likely to solve within 
four minutes, was predictive of actual performance for non-
insight problems, but not for insight problems.  “The idea 
that subjects may have privileged access to idiosyncratic 
information that makes them especially able to predict their 
own performance,” Metcalfe and Wiebe conclude, “was 
overwhelmingly wrong in this experiment” (1987, p. 242). 
vii Further constraints, along the lines that the answer be 
“telling” (see Section 1), might also be imposed. 
viii A similar result obtains within van Fraassen’s account when R 
is limited to causation.  Then the question asking for a 
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causal account of the shadow’s length presumably has as the 
core of its answer a proposition ascribing to the flagpole its 
(correct) height, while the question about the flagpole’s 
height has at the core of its answer not a proposition that 
ascribes to the shadow its length (for this does not bear the 
right causal relation to the height of the flagpole), but one 
which cites various facts involving the causal history of the 
flagpole’s construction.  Thus the two questions receive 
asymmetrical answers. 
ix As Kitcher and Salmon (1987, p. 316) note, this approach is 
suggested by Hempel in his response to a variant of the 
flagpole scenario posed of his covering law account;  see 
Hempel (1965), pp. 352-353. 
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